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From Nagasaki to Toronto

Omond Solandt and the Defence Research Board’s Early
Vision of Atomic Warfare, 1945-1947
Jason S. Ridler
Although Canada did not embark on an atomic weapons programme, and indeed actively supported proposals for
atomic disarmament, nonetheless the Canadian Services had to be trained and equipped to ﬁght in atomic wars should
the need ever arise. Helping in this task was the central role of the Defence Research Board.1
O.M. Solandt, 1958

US Air Force Photo

O

mond McKillop Solandt’s
selection in 1945 as the founding
director general of the Defence
Research Board (DRB), Canada’s
first peacetime defence research
organization, owed much to his
experience in the investigation of
the results of the nuclear attacks
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From
October to December 1945, Colonel
Solandt,2 a physiologist and pioneer
in operational research, headed the
British ﬁeld team that examined the
number and nature of casualties from
the atomic bombs. Thus in 1945 he
was the only Canadian ofﬁcer with
ﬁrst hand expertise on the reality of
atomic weapons.3
Upon becoming director-general
of the DRB Solandt made it his top
priority to share this expertise in
a series of lectures for Canadian
leaders in industry, medicine, and
civil defence, as well as the military.
These lectures, by Canada’s leading
defence scientist, provide a frank
and detailed account at the dawn of
the nuclear age of atomic weapons
about the damage Canadian cities
would suffer in a nuclear war. For
Solandt atomic war was no theory
but a reality that had to be confronted

ABSTRACT: In November 1945, Canadian
physiologist Colonel Omond Solandt
became one of a handful of experts
on the effects of atomic warfare as
a member of the British Mission to
Japan (BMJ). The BMJ investigated the
effects of the atomic bombs dropped
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both
on structures and people. Solandt’s
casualty analysis and experience in
Japan became the prism by which his
pragmatic intellect viewed atomic
affairs during his tenure as Chairman
of Canada’s Defence Research Board
(1946-1956), including the impact of
atomic war on Canada.

in two ways. First, there had to be
a concerted international effort for
a stable peace. Second, given the
likelihood that such an endeavour
would fail, Canadian leaders had to
understand nuclear warfare and be
prepared for the worst. For Solandt,
this realistic understanding was
the critical component of “active
defence” in the Cold War. One of
the DRB’s chief responsibilities for
national defence, in his view, was to
impart that understanding.

Career Highlights 1930-1945

S

olandt came to military affairs
by circumstance rather than
inclination. Born in Winnipeg in
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1909 to a clergyman and a universityeducated mother, young Solandt
held a wide array of interests which
eventually led him to study science
at the University of Toronto in 1927.
He received gold medal standing
for his bachelor thesis in biological
and medical science in 1931 before
beginning his master’s in physiology
under the guidance of Dr. Charles
Best, the co-discoverer, alongside
Sir Frederick Banting, of insulin. 4
Best would introduce Solandt to
his Cambridge mentors, including
Sir Alan Drury. Under Drury’s
guidance, Solandt received his
doctorate of medicine (MD) in 1936,
and passed the dreaded exams set for
membership in the Royal College of
Physicians in 1939; a stellar rise for a
young Canadian.5
Solandt was set to teach courses
on mammalian physiology but
the start of the Second World War
changed that. Over the next six years,
he distinguished himself in senior
medical and defence research posts.
He was the director of the Southwest
London Blood depot (1940) during
the early German bombing campaign
against London. He was then assigned
by the Medical Research Council to

27
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The atomic explosion at
Nagasaki, 9 August 1945.
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Colonel Omand Solandt photographed
shortly after his arrival in Hiroshima,
Japan.

create and direct the Physiological
Laboratory at the Armoured Fighting
Vehicles School at Lulworth Cove in
Dorset. At Lulworth, Solandt and
his team solved a crew problem by
improving ventilation in armoured
vehicles, and he soon became a
pioneer in operational research.6 This
success resulted in his assignment in
1942 to the British Army Operational
Research Group (AORG). 7 The
following year Solandt became deputy
to the AORG’s superintendent,
the South African radar pioneer
Basil Schonland, whom Solandt
greatly admired.8 By February 1944,
Solandt joined the Canadian army
with the rank of lieutenant-colonel.
When Schonland was selected to
become science advisor (SA) to
Field Marshal B.L. Montgomery for
the Normandy campaign in 1944,
Solandt became superintendent of
the BAORG with the rank of colonel.9
After the German surrender in May
1945, he received the appointment
as science advisor to Lord Louis
Mountbatten, commander-in-chief of
South-East Asian Command and was
prepared to depart for Burma when
the atomic bombs were dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August
1945. The selection of a Canadian
physiologist to get ﬁrst hand data on
atomic warfare largely rested on his
medical training, his wartime record
of excellence in managing a host
of technological endeavours, and a
pragmatism that matched his strong
and meticulous intellect. All would
be needed in the mission to Japan.
28 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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The US Strategic
Bombing Survey

O

n 3 November 1944 President
Franklin D. Roosevelt approved
Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s
request for the creation of a survey
mission to conduct a “scientific
investigation of all the evidence” of
strategic bombing in the European
Theatre that would provide the data
needed for assessing post war strategic
planning. The United States Strategic
Bombing Survey (USSBS) came
under leadership of Colonel Franklin
D’Olier, President of Prudential Life
Insurance Company.10
After the atomic bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, President
Harry S Truman authorized a mission
for the Paciﬁc. On 15 August 1945
Truman suggested to D’Olier that:
[I]t would be similarly valuable for
our post-war planning and future

policies to have the same kind of
impartial and expert study of the
effects of our aerial efforts in the
war against Japan. This study would

U of T Archives, B1991-0015/011(20)

University of Toronto Archives (U of T Archives), B1991-0015/024(10)
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include the effects of all types of air
attack.11

D’Olier, with Paul Nitze as his
vice chair, began to assemble a
team for Japan. In the fall of 1945,
the US Chiefs of Staff invited the
British to send their own mission to
Japan. The British had participated
in the European survey 12 and gladly
accepted the offer. The British had
contributed signiﬁcantly to the US
led effort to create the atomic bomb
and were especially keen to assess
the scope of atomic damage to an
island nation for their own post war
strategic planning.13
The British Chiefs of Staff quickly
assembled the team, known as the
British Mission to Japan (BMJ). It
would be led by Professor W.N.
Thomas, a civil engineer from Cardiff
University in Wales, who had led
many bomb damage assessment
teams for the British Ministry of
Home Security during the Blitz.14
In the fall of 1945, Solandt had
become the Army Council’s scientiﬁc
advisor in the War Ofﬁce. He was
selected to represent the British
army and instructed to investigate
structural damage to military
institutions. As Solandt later recalled,
however, “there were no military
installations in either Hiroshima or
Nagasaki so I spent most of my time
studying casualties from a medical
point of view.” 15 Throughout his
wartime experience Solandt had
concerned himself with the nature
of casualties. Solandt worked on
blood research for bombing victims
during the Blitz, corresponded with
Home Security scientist Professor
Solly Zuckerman on the nature of
bombing casualties, and worked on
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many tank casualty reports himself
at Lulworth.16 He would head one of
the two ﬁeld units.
During the mission, Solandt
received a directive from the US
Chiefs of Staff on the nature of
relations between the two bodies. It
emphasized the collaborative nature
of the enterprise, and included the
following points:
3. The activities of the British party
will, therefore, be governed by the
terms of reference of the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey.
You should in consultation with
Professor Thomas, head of the
Civil Defence party, arrange
with M. Franklin D’Olier, the
Chairman of the U.S.S.B.S., how
to make the best use of your
particular qualiﬁcations, bearing
in mind…the special importance
of studying the results of the two
atom bomb incidents at Hiroshima

4. You should not make any
inquiries into research,
constructional or operational
aspects of atomic bombing that are
outside the scope of the U.S.S.B.S
terms of reference.17

The mission left Britain on 11
October and, after a week’s stay in
Washington, arrived in Tokyo on
27 October, where it was briefed on
the effects of the atomic bomb by
Japanese physicists and doctors who
had been working with the American
survey teams. 18 The mission then
spent an entire day ﬂying in a C-47,
examining other bomb sites in Japan
to assess the differences with the
atomic devastation of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Solandt confessed that
from the air only an expert could tell
the difference between conventional
and atomic bomb damage. The real
work would have to be from the
ground.19 Still, what they did see was
“almost overwhelming. Each one

of these cities had been extensively
devastated.”20
On 31 October, the mission, now
situated at the British Consulate,
began its work in Nagasaki. The
USSBS provided lodgings and jeep
transportation but largely left the
British mission to its own devices.
It was then that Solandt, because
there were no military institutions of
signiﬁcance in Nagasaki, turned the
team’s attention to casualty analysis.21
He was joined in this effort by Jacob
Bronowski, a renowned statistician
adept at the mathematics of casualty
surveys. Together, they investigated
the number and nature of casualties
from the atomic bomb in Nagasaki (213 November) then Hiroshima (14-24
November), Bronowski concentrating
on the former and Solandt on the
latter.22
Walking through the world’s ﬁrst
atomic battleﬁeld was a life changing
experience for both Solandt and

and Nagasaki.

Nagasaki – A general view of the area near the centre of the
damage, which is to the left of the picture, only 300 yards away
from the bridge. Note how little remains of the blasted and burnt
Japanese dwellings.
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Bronowski, and the two became good
friends. Bronowski later recorded his
impressions:

I real

pract

were

he p
On a ﬁne November day in 1945, late

large

in the afternoon, I was landed on

Japa

an airstrip in Southern Japan. From

conc

there a jeep was to take me over the

Soland
long af
that:

mountains to join a ship which lay
in Nagasaki Harbour…suddenly I
was aware that we were already at
the centre of damage in Nagasaki.

The

The shadows behind me were the

notic

skeletons of the Mitsubishi factory

part

buildings, pushed backwards and
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not a
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jeep. Looking back at his friendship
with Bronowski during that period,
he reﬂected

and s

to th

[Sola

to be

or si
U of T Archives, B1991-0015/011(20)

all d

30 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
Published

Ridler - Solandt.indd 30

sma

Nagasaki:

seve

Top: Mass distortion of steel-framed
shed buildings about half a mile from
the centre of damage. It can be seen
that the entire main frame is seriously
distorted away from the explosion.

looki

Middle: This photo was taken 130 feet
from ground level zero.

full o

Bottom: The Roman Catholic Church
600 yards from the centre of damage.
The walls were of heavy load-bearing
brick construction. Most of the damage
is attributable to blast, although ﬁre
subsequently consumed all combustible
debris. The huts in the foreground were
erected as temporary living quarters by
the Japanese after the attack.
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The goal of the mission was to
discover the number and nature of
deaths in relation to the distance from
the explosion and what structures
were in the path of the shockwave
and radiation. 26 Japanese hospital
records on casualties were scattered
throughout the region but they were
of almost no value.

I realize that I was probably the more
practical of the two, since when we
were out together I drove while
he planned. Incidentally, driving a

, late

large ¾ ton Dodge 4 x 4 in a ruined

d on

Japanese city requires as much
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r the

h lay

nly I

concentration as writing poetry.

24

Solandt, in a letter to his family not
long after the work began, reported
that:

1.

Ordinary thermal burns due

to direct radiation from the heated
air around the explosives.
2.

By irradiation with gamma

rays and other short-wave
radiations.
3.

By blast.

4.

Secondary injuries due to

being hurled against buildings
or hit by buildings. Burns due to

dy at

The rescue services were so slow in

ﬁres should be included in this

saki.

The damage is quite up to advance

coming into action after the bombing

group.29

e the

notices. The bomb lit in the northern

and were so inadequate that no

ctory

part of the town where most of

records were kept of the dead, injured,

and

the factories are and completely

missing and evacuated people.

What

devastated an area about one mile

The hospitals were so swamped

s was

wide and 2 ½ miles long…I’ve been

with work that their records are

roof

spending the last few days looking

of little value. The Japanese did

ut the

at the casualties that remain. They

make scattered attempts to keep

eters;

are a sorry looking lot since most

records beginning a few days after

oned

of them have had practically no

the bombing but these were very

hing

treatment. Fortunately most of the

incomplete.27

and

bad cases are dead and the others

te of

are getting better…The attitude of

this

the Japs is quite amazing. They treat

ly as

the Americans as welcome guests

aters

not as conquerors. The Americans
in turn are very friendly especially to
the kids. The kids are very attractive
and spend most of their time talking
to the troops. Kids about Sigrid’s
[Solandt’s eldest daughter] age are
to be seen carrying small brother
or sister [sic] about on their backs
all day – no wonder they grow up
small and tough…I spent many
several hours [in the previous days]

ramed
e from
e seen
riously
on.

looking at damage in the residential

30 feet

full of dirty little kids with running

Church
amage.
earing
amage
gh ﬁre
ustible
d were
ters by

quarters – I have never seen such
ﬁlth in all my life. It is a mystery how
anyone survives. Every place is just
noses and impetigo and probably
ﬂeas. I had a bath immediately upon
returning.25

Nagasaki – Blast effect on a gasholder
half a mile away from the centre of
damage. Not the way in which the whole
framework has been bent away from the
explosion.
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When he first arrived Solandt
also received information from a
US/Japanese Joint Commission
for the Investigation of the Effects
on the Atomic Bomb that worked
under the direct authority of General
Douglas McArthur, Supreme Allied
Commander in the Paciﬁc.28 Solandt’s
interpreter was a further source,
supplying ﬁrst hand accounts of what
had happened.
Solandt classiﬁed casualties into
four general categories:

Solandt learned from the American/
Japanese team that out of a population
of 250,000 there were 21,000 killed,
1,000 missing, and 40,000 injured.
All those out in the open and within
1000 metres of the centre died, though
the cause of death was difﬁcult to
determine.30
Those who were 1000-2000 metres
away received heavy doses of radiant
heat and gamma rays. Thick clothing
could screen against the former,
but the latter could penetrate up to
15 inches of concrete. Blast created
minimal casualties at this range (10
percent). Screening determined the
nature of the casualties at this range.
The lightly clothed, which was most
people in the summer heat, suffered
severe ﬂash burns and died before the
radiation could kill them. Those who
were more than 2000 meters away
generally survived the flashburns

31
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but showed symptoms of irradiation,
including epilation (hair removed
from the roots).
While investigating some cases
of structural damage, Solandt came
upon two Franciscans from Quebec,
Father Prudent Moffette and Brother
Moreau. They had been in Japan for 17
years and were interned when the war
broke out. Nagasaki, they claimed,
had over 16,000 Roman Catholics
and 8-10,000 were killed.31 Solandt
also interviewed an eyewitness of
the blast from the Tsuruoka Maru, a
10,000 ton vessel that was 4, 000 yards
away.

followed by four smaller ones which
they think were not echoes. The
ship rocked violently but was not in
any danger of capsizing. They did
not emphasize any feeling of wind.
Several others on the ship had mild
ﬂash burns on exposed skin. A few
had blisters on the their forearms.
Next the whole area was covered
with a white smoke which rose
forming a bright ﬁery column which
white smoke. The bright white smoke
rose and was followed by bluish
smoke and then ﬂames. The ﬂames
appeared within 1-2 minutes of the

Three of them were on the bridge

his hat [black] charred by the ﬂash—

at the time – watched the parachute

they disagreed about ﬂame on the

come down and one went to get

hat. Trees on the east of the harbour

glasses to observe them more clearly.

were seen to burst into ﬂames within

All were looking toward [the] bomb

a minute or two. They also [saw]

when it went off. They saw a bright

several small vessels between them

white light – heard one loud bang

and the bomb burning. 32
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The entire mission was a rushed
affair. The British were eager to get
as much ﬁrst hand data as possible to
make their own independent analysis
so that they would not have to rely
entirely on US data. In preparing his
reports, Solandt was adamant that the
British Chiefs of Staff understand that
the initial reports were preliminary
at best and would be superceded
by the final report. 33 Solandt and
Bronowski worked on at least three
drafts before completing the report
“Casualties Due to the Atomic Bomb
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki” in late
November. This paper was included
in the ﬁnal report of the Mission, The
Effects of the Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki (1946).34
The most important point made
by Bronowski and Solandt was that
at both cities civil defence measures,
physical shelters and a proper
organization had been virtually nonexistent. Had such measures been
in place, the damage and casualties,
although devastating, would have
been less severe. Such views are not
surprising for men who worked so
extensively in British civil defence.

ended in a mushroom shaped head of

ﬁrst ﬂash. One man on the ship had

32 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
Published
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Hiroshima – A general view looking
across the centre of damage. Some
framed buildings quite near the centre
remained standing. The foreground
illustrates the remains of Japanese
dwellings, razed to the ground.

Solandt and the Defence
Research Board’s view of
Atomic Bombs

S

olandt returned to Canada via the
continental US on 15 December
and arrived in Ottawa three days
later. He completed his journey to
England on 23 December. During
the stopover in Ottawa LieutenantGeneral Charles Foulkes, chief of the
general staff since August, offered
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Solandt the job of director general of
the new Defence Research Board.35
Foulkes was convinced that
Canada’s post war defence required
scientiﬁc research capabilities that
speciﬁcally served the military. One
of the key elements in Allied victory
over the Axis during the Second
World War had been a massive
and concerted scientiﬁc effort that
had been effectively applied to
technology and operations. Canada
had contributed significantly in
many areas including radar and
communications, explosives, and the
research that had helped to develop
the atomic bomb. The defection of
Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in
the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, in

September 1945 had shaken the status
quo. This revelation of a concerted
Soviet espionage campaign against
Canada, Britain and the United States
dimmed hopes for a stable, lasting
peace built on cooperation among the
wartime Allied powers and signaled
the beginnings of the cold war.
Emerging technologies such as
jet aircraft and rockets destroyed
the illusion that Canada remained
a “fire proof house” safe in its
geographical isolation. The Canadian
military required scientiﬁc research
capabilities. 36 During the war,
Canadian defence research had
grown under the National Research
Council (NRC) and its wartime
President C.J. Mackenzie. 37 After

the war the NRC quickly divested
itself of most defence projects, and
Mackenzie supported Foulkes’s
argument for a separate defence
research establishment.38
Solandt was appointed director
general defence research on 28
December 1945. The Defence Research
Board was subsequently “born” on 28
March 1947 and integrated within
the defence department under the
National Defence Act. Its mandate was
to serve the military, act as the chief
repository of research knowledge for
the minister of National Defence, and
run its own research establishments.
The director general of the DRB had
an equivalent rank of lieutenantgeneral, the same level as the chiefs

Hiroshima city hall, near ground level zero.
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of the three armed services, and
was a full member of the chiefs of
staff committee who participated
in Cabinet Defence Committee
meetings.39
Evidence about how Solandt
was selected is largely anecdotal.
His name was initially suggested to
Foulkes by Solandt’s mentor Charles
Best, who had worked on wartime
medical research projects for the
Canadian military.40 Upon Solandt’s
retirement from the DRB in 1956,
Mackenzie shared with him his own
recollections:

the corridor Charles said “The
only Canadian that I know who
has any connection with defence
research and who would likely be
available is a man called Omond
Solandt.” I immediately said “That
is interesting because I have had him
recommended to me by many people
whose judgment I respect and I had
intended to suggest the same name.”
We stopped immediately and said
why don’t we go back at once and
make our recommendations, which
we did. I doubt if any recommending
Committee ever acted so soon after
their appointment and I don’t think

I don’t know whether you ever knew

any recommendation ever proved a

the details but a group of us met in

better one.41

C.D.’s [Howe, minister of Munitions
and Supply] ofﬁce to decide whether
or not to separate military and
normal N.R.C. activities. The Cabinet
Ministers agreed to such a decision
and the next question arose as to
who would head the organization.
[Lieutenant-General] Charles
Foulkes [chief of the general staff]
and I were appointed a Committee
to make recommendations. As we
left C.D.’s office and went down

34 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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By 1946 Canadian policy towards
nuclear weapons was already taking
shape. Canada had participated
in various scientific efforts that
contributed to the making of
the atomic bomb. This included
membership in the Combined Policy
Committee that had coordinated
atomic research in the US, Canada
and Britain. The end of the war forced
Ottawa to review its participation

and w
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Polished concrete has been roughened
by ﬂash heat effect at a distance of
200 yards from the centre of damage
in Hiroshima. The polish remains only
where shielded by (a) a man seated on
the steps; (b) a man leaning against the
corner of the plinth adjoining the steps;
and (c) in the shadows of the plinth
mouldings.

in nuclear development. King and
L.B. Pearson, Undersecretary of
State for External Affairs had gone
to Washington in 1945 after the
atomic bombs had been dropped
and told the US Undersecretary of
State Dean Acheson that Canada
would not pursue an independent
atomic weapons policy.42 The passing
of the McMahon Act by the US
Congress in 1946 effectively ended
US participation with Ottawa and
London on atomic projects, outside
of buying uranium products from
the Canadian government’s crown
corporation El Dorado.43
This did not mean Canada
ignored atomic affairs. Political
efforts were made towards a modus
vivendi with the US on atomic affairs
after the MacMahon act, and relations
on defence science matters with
Great Britain remained strong. The
creation of the research reactor at
Chalk River, Ontario continued
despite the removal of key British
scientists in the post war period.
The Canadian military also began
embryonic doctrine on dealing with
the casualties resulting from atomic
weapons. Indeed, the Canadian
government was all too cognizant
of the new atomic world that had
been awakened at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.44 Solandt made it his goal
as leader of the DRB to educate
leading elements of Canadian society,
both within and outside government,
about the reality of atomic warfare

U of T Archives, B1991-0015/024(29)

U of T Archives, B1991-0015/011(10)
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and what it meant to Canada in
military and civil defence terms.
Among the many lectures Solandt
gave in his ﬁrst year at the DRB was
a presentation in Toronto on 24
April 1947 to the Voluntary Health
Committee of the House of Commons,
a government committee concerned
with medical affairs. The lecture
took place against the backdrop of
deepening international tensions.
Soviet failure to remove troops from
Iran in 1946 had created a war scare
less than a year after victory in the
Paciﬁc. Germany remained divided
and its fate undecided. Stalin and his
ministers refused to consider anything
but weak neighbour states on their
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In thinking about the bomb, it is
therefore essential to realize that
present developments in aircraft,
and future development in rockets,
will make it possible to attack this
country from the air from almost any
part of the world. The old days when
we could feel secure behind oceans
patrolled by friendly and powerful
navies are gone. We must consider
atomic bombs and other weapons of
the future, not merely as weapons
that might be used in the destruction
of some enemy on distant shores,
but as weapons that might at any
time be used to destroy our homes
and cities.46

A British ofﬁcer poses in a Japanese defensive position in Hiroshima.

U of T Archives, B1991-0015/024(29)
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borders, and pursued aggressive
diplomacy in the Mediterranean.
On 12 March 1947, just weeks before
Solandt’s presentation in Toronto,
President Truman, responding to a
British request to take up Britain’s
role in Mediterranean affairs, had
proclaimed the “Truman Doctrine”
– the US would support those that
opposed the inﬂuence of Moscow. A
new war, in the atomic age, seemed
very possible.45
Solandt began his lecture by
emphasizing that Canadians still
found active warfare in North
America difficult to comprehend,
and that this complacency was
dangerous:
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Solandt then explored the
lethality of atomic weapons, based
on the reports of the British Mission,
USSBS, and his own observations
from his time in Japan. He told the
crowd he intended to make a clinical
analysis and suggested they read John
Hershey’s bestselling book Hiroshima
for accurate personal accounts.
Solandt emphasized that
atomic bombs caused casualties in
significantly different ways than
regular high explosives. They could,
of course, injure by direct wounds
from the fragments of the bomb, by

blowing bits of buildings against
people, and people against buildings,
or from direct blast, like HE bombs.
What made the atomic bomb unique
was its release of vast quantities of
energy, both in the blast wave and
as radiant energy. The radiant energy
released extended through the entire
spectrum and included light, heat and
penetrating gamma rays. The radiant
heat caused severe burns and gamma
rays produced “delayed death by
injury to the blood forming organs.”47
Solandt warned that estimates of the
deaths in Hiroshima and Nagasaki

were tentative at best, but provided
the following ﬁgures:

by burn
added
He

15-20% died as a result of gamma
radiation.

The h

20-30% died of ﬂash burns.

or so

50-60% were killed from falling

laste

buildings.48

dista

mile

Solandt excluded from his
analysis deaths resulting from
collapsed structures. “We have
become hardened to descriptions
of this sort as a result of years of
bombing in many lands. The injuries

very

unde

black

dura

cloth
The

been

they

light
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Atomic bomb damage in Hiroshima.
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ovided

by burns and gamma rays possess the
added interest of novelty.”49
He further explained:
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At the time of the explosion they

rays. The remaining twenty six

were at various places in the ground

girls, operating the Army telephone

of Hiroshima Castle, a little more

exchange, in a deep concrete shelter,

than half a mile from where the bomb

were uninjured.52

The heat liberated during the second

exploded. Of a group of fifty one

or so during which the explosion

who were in the open engaged in a

lasted was so intense that people at

ceremony of devotion to the emperor,

distances up to two and half or three

all were so severely burned that they

miles suffered burns not unlike a

died within a few days. Eight of

very severe sunburn. People directly

the remainder were in the wooden

under the bomb were actually charred

dormitory where the group slept. Of

black. The heat was of such short

these, two were killed by the falling

duration that buildings and even light

buildings and one was knocked into

clothing gave complete protection.

a moat and downed. The remaining

The effect was as if a spotlight had

ﬁve were apparently uninjured as

been turned on the victims and

they had been protected from burns

they had been burned wherever the

by the light building in which they

light fell on their exposed skin…

were working. They all died in 12 to

Some people achieved a somewhat

19 days from the effect of the gamma

Solandt’s occasionally dark sense
of humour almost got the best of him
in the original draft of this lecture.
He deleted two “grim but interesting
jokes” played by fate in the dropping
of the atomic bomb. In one case a
considerable percentage of Japanese
prison inmates were sterilized
by gamma rays from the bomb,
“thus achieving a result that ardent
advocates of eugenics have never
been able to bring about.” Then there
was the case of a Japanese professor
of radiology at Nagasaki medical

limited immortality when the heat
permanently etched their shadow

U of T Archives, B1991-0015/024(26)

upon the roads and buildings.50

Gamma rays, Solandt continued,
penetrate through human tissue. This
includes bone marrow, the spleen,
and lymph nodes, places where blood
cells are formed. The gamma rays
killed the cells that normally divide to
provide the body with new cells and
death would occur within days or
weeks, usually preceded by complete
hair loss. Solandt also emphasized
that many people recovered from
gamma ray exposure. More tragically,
all pregnant women within a mile
of the bomb had miscarriages. No
babies survived.51
Solandt attempted to simplify
the complex effects of the bomb by
focusing on one case study from his
own experience. This was the group
of 85 high school girls formed into a
military unit in Hiroshima.

Omond Solandt.
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school. The man had been slowly
dying from leukemia; “proper x-ray
treatment to prolong his life was not
available in Japan.” When the bomb
went off, he was at such a distance
that the dosage of gamma rays would
have likely have prolonged his life.
Unfortunately, he was standing in
front of a lead screen at the time. He
died of the leukemia a few weeks
later.53
Solandt proceeded with a slide
show to explore and illustrate
the effects of such weapons on a
Canadian city. “In order to simplify
the problem of visualizing the
damage the hypothetical bomb
has been exploded directly over our
auditorium.” 54 The zero point was
the corner of College and Yonge in
downtown Toronto. “There would
be 30,000 houses damaged beyond
repair,” he concluded:
35,000 requiring extensive repair and
50-100,000 requiring ﬁrst-aid repairs.
This would result in about 400,000

Solandt next examined the nature
of the atomic bomb as a weapon. He
made it clear that, as the Mission
and USSBS reports had concluded,
it had “tremendous but not unique
destructive powers. The devastation
wrought by ordinary HE bombs in
Hamburg and by incendiaries in
Tokyo was just as great as that in
Hiroshima.” Atomic bombs were
expensive to make but cheap to use,
reducing the cost of destroying cities
to would be aggressors as well as
accelerating the rate at which cities,
like Toronto, could be destroyed.
“This tremendous increase in the rate
of destruction is probably the most
important new factor that the atomic
bomb as introduced to war.”56 There
now existed a relatively inexpensive
way for aggressors with global reach
to destroy cities.
“We must,” Solandt declared,
“either be continually prepared for
war or else eliminate the possibility
of war.” The latter was a very faint
hope.

people being rendered homeless.

of the location of new buildings and
industries of national importance
and the preparation of plans for
the treatment of casualties.

57

Solandt ended his lecture on a
positive note. He championed the
efforts by General A.G.L. McNaughton,
Canada’s representative on the United
Nations Atomic Energy Commission,
to regulate the creation and use of
nuclear weapons, and called for the
active pursuit of the elimination of
war. As a doctor and a scientist, he
had seen the terriﬁc beneﬁts from
knowledge applied to relieve human
suffering. War no doubt seemed
the antithesis to such endevours.
Indeed, Solandt would spend the
greater part of his life championing
the use of science and technology to
alleviate hunger and poverty in the
third world. Solandt saw the United
Nations (UN) as a possible problem
solver of the dilemmas facing the
world. But Solandt was also a realist.
“Russian Imperialists” and their use
of communist ideology threatened
world stability and had to be faced,
even in a world with atomic weapons.
This mix of the scientists’ belief in
rational solutions and progress and
a Cold Warrior’s realism led Solandt
to a hopeful pragmatism concerning
Canada’s fate in the atomic age.

About half of these could return to

Until wars cease to occur we must be

their homes after temporary repairs.

prepared to defend ourselves against

Of the remaining 200,000 about 50,000

all forms of attack including atomic

would have been killed and an equal

bombs. I do not subscribe to the

number would require prolonged

views that there is no defence against

hospital treatment. This leaves about

the atomic bomb. At least for the

100,000 who would require to be

next few years atomic bombs will be

rehoused [sic] either permanently

carried in ordinary bombers which

of for the several months required to

can be intercepted and destroyed just

make major repairs. It is not possible

as in the past. When the long range

War is still possible, and if we really

to appreciate the significance of

rocket carrying an atomic warhead

believe in our cause we must be

such ﬁgures at ﬁrst glance. As you

becomes a reality, there is little doubt

prepared to ﬁght for it if necessary.

consider them, new and terrible

that there be some means of defence

We must even make preparations for

implications appear. Just think, for

against it. In addition to this active

the possibility of atomic bombs being

instance, of the added suffering if

defence which is the responsibility of

dropped on Canadian cities, but

such an incident occurred in sub-zero

the Armed Forces, much can be done

such preparations must always be

in the ﬁeld of Civil Defence. Here

regarded as secondary in importance

the important measures will include

to our primary task of helping to

psychological preparation of the

evolve a wold organization that will

people, so that attack will not weaken

make war impossible.58

weather.

55

As the crowd considered these
ﬁgures, a movie on Hiroshima was
shown.
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n 1945 Omond Solandt became
a chief contributor to Canada’s
early Cold War defence policy. As
Chairman of the Defence Research
Board, he maintained and oversaw
the nation’s ﬁrst peacetime defence
research establishment, served the
defence research interests of the
Canadian Armed Forces, and provided
the minister of National Defence
critical scientiﬁc and technological
knowledge. He brought to these tasks
a vast, sharp and diverse intellect that
reﬂected his interests and experience,
the most compelling at the time being
his work in Nagasaki and Hiroshima
in the wake of the world’s ﬁrst atomic
attacks.
Because of his unique
qualiﬁcations and life choices, Solandt
arrived in Ottawa as Canada’s chief
expert on the effects of atomic
weapons. His timing was impeccable.
Solandt became director general
of the DRB just as the relationship
between Moscow and the west
soured under Soviet intransigence
and adventurism in the Middle East
and the Mediterranean. As one of his
ﬁrst lectures of 1947 shows, Solandt
feared the consequences of atomic
weapons but he feared ignorance of
their effect even more. Looking at the
future from the start of the Cold War,
Solandt mined his experience to paint
a picture for his audience of hard
realities and the need to face them
despite the costs. Hope remained in
the UN, but as they say in the Army
hope is not a method. Knowledge of
the realities of atomic weapons was
the ﬁrst step in coming to grips with
their place in the world. Solandt,
while not a fan of fiction, would
no doubt have championed science
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ﬁction author Isaac Asimov’s famous
quip as it pertained to Canada’s view
of atomic weapons:
If knowledge can create problems, it
is not through ignorance that we can
solve them.

For Solandt, knowledge of the reality
of atomic warfare was the necessary
ﬁrst step towards sustainable peace
or resolve in war.
8.
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